The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' recent decision in International Dairy Foods Association v. Boggs, while ultimately resulting in regulation pertaining to milk labeling that is similar to regulations in other states, provides a useful framework for challenging the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)'s contention that it lacks the authority to mandate labeling of milk from cattle that have been treated with the hormone rBST. The court in Boggs found that a compositional difference exists between milk from cows treated with the hormone and those that were not, which could be considered a material fact mandating labeling under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. This Article discusses the history of the FDA's statutory authority to regulate food products, as well as considers the Act's purposes with respect to labeling, and the agency's interpretation of that grant of authority. The Article then discusses the FDA's controversial approval of rBST and the resulting challenge to that decision. The article concludes by discussing how the decision in Boggs can be instrumental in requiring FDA to mandate labeling of milk from cows treated with rBST due to the court's acknowledgement of the compositional difference between conventional and rBST free milk.
Part I of this article will provide a brief history of the FDA's authority under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as well as the Act's purposes with respect to labeling, and briefly consider the agency's interpretation of that grant of authority. Part II of the article will discuss the FDA's approval of rBST and the resulting challenge to that decision. In Part III, the article will provide an overview of the First Amendment litigation challenging dairy producers' and manufacturers' ability to include statements about rBST on the labels of their products. Finally, Part IV of this article demonstrates how the recent decision in International Dairy Foods Association v. Boggs 4 can be instrumental in requiring FDA to mandate labeling of milk from cows treated with rBST due to the court's acknowledgement of the compositional difference between conventional and rBST free milk.
I. History of the Statutory Grant of Authority to Regulate Food Products

A. The Pure Foods and Drugs Act of 1906
The Food and Drug Administration is the self-proclaimed "oldest comprehensive consumer protection agency in the U. S. federal government."
5 Initially, the agency was formed as part of the Bureau of Chemistry, but first came into existence in its modern day incarnation with the passage of the Federal Foods and Drugs Act, as the law created the agency's regulatory functions.
6 After many unsuccessful attempts at passage of uniform federal legislation directed at addressing the increasingly disconcerting issues of food safety and adulteration in the late 1800s, President Theodore Roosevelt finally signed the law into effect in 1906. 7 With regard to drugs, the law both created and defined very specific standards, which were not also outlined for food products, but the Act did "prohibit the addition of any ingredients that would substitute for the food, conceal damage, pose a health hazard, or constitute a filthy or decomposed substance." 8 In the early years, the agency's main emphasis was the regulation of food rather than drugs because Harvey W. Wiley, the agency's chief administrator, a chemist, and longtime champion of pure foods, found that foods posed a greater risk to human health than drugs as he determined that most chemical additives were "unnecessary adulterants." 9 To test his theories about the dangers of specific food additives and preservatives frequently used in the early 1900s, Wiley received government funding to conduct a series of experiments. He assembled a group of young men, given the nomenclature the "Poison Squad" by journalists covering the trials, and fed them meals composed of the best quality ingredients prepared "in the most appetizing and hygienic fashion" 10 that were also laced with measured amounts of suspect preservatives and additives customarily used by domestic and foreign food producers.
All of the men in the study demonstrated ill effects as a result of their participation, which led Wiley to conclude that "the effect of food preservatives on the system was…mildly injurious or deadly, according to the amount and character of the preservatives absorbed."
11 The Poison Squad experiments greatly influenced Wiley's opinions about the need for strict regulation of chemical additives and preservatives in food products, hence his heavy emphasis on this issue during his tenure as the chief administrator. On this point, however, Wiley's views diverged with the President and then Secretary of Agriculture, James Wilson, who favored scientific advances in the field. This difference of opinion between Wiley and the Administration ultimately led to Wiley's resignation from the agency in 1912. 
The Food and Drugs Act in the Courts
One of the early cases decided after the passage of the Act demonstrates both the Supreme Court's willingness to recognize a broad grant of authority to the agency, as well as the agency's aggressive approach in interpreting the requirements under the new statute with respect to misbranding. In U. S. v. Antikamnia Chemical Company 13 , the Court considered a challenge under the Federal Foods and Drug Act to the government's requirement that a drug's label include not only its ingredients, but also any derivatives.
14 In response to the argument that the agency was overstepping its statutory grant of authority and creating greater requirements under the law than those provided by Congress, the Court stated, "the purpose of the act is to secure the purity of food and drugs, and to inform purchasers of what they are buying. Its provisions are directed to that purpose and must be construed to effect [sic] it."
15 Ultimately, the Court found the agency's requirements for greater disclosures in labeling did not create a significant burden for the manufacturers or producers, as they are fully aware of the ingredients included in their products, and greater disclosure was in the best interest of the public health.
16
A decade later, the Court considered a misbranding case involving a product labeled and marketed as apple cider vinegar that was made from dehydrated apples which, during the manufacturing process, were rehydrated with water in substantially the same amount as that removed in the dehydration process.
17 While the resulting product contained very small amounts of barium, resulting from the manufacturing process, no claims were made that this substance was injurious to or presented a threat to public health. 18 Additionally, none of the parties suggested that the cider produced was of inferior quality or taste, although the district judge did note a slight difference in both taste and appearance. 19 Ultimately, the Court found that even though the resulting product was similar, if not virtually identical, to apple cider vinegar made from fresh apples, the addition of the water created a different product entirely, which caused the product to be misbranded as it was not "the identical thing that the brand indicates it to be." 20 Therefore, while the statements on the label were technically correct, the Court found them misleading to consumers. Interestingly, the Court noted that its holding with respect to misbranding was not based on the differences in production or manufacture between the two products, as disclosures regarding those processes were not required under the law. 21 Rather, the decision was based on the fact that the substance marketed and labeled as apple cider vinegar was not, in fact, apple cider vinegar because of the compositional difference in substance and ingredients.
22
In each of these cases, the Court demonstrated an unwillingness to permit manufacturers and producers from misleading consumers by purporting to sell a product that was not exactly what it said it was or failed to include full disclosures regarding the specific ingredients. As the cases note, the Court based its decisions on the express language of the Federal Food and Drugs Act, as well as the clear congressional intent to both protect the purity and safety of food and fully inform consumers about the products they were purchasing. Part of the reasoning behind this approach was to prevent economic harm to consumers by adopting a low tolerance for inferior food products labeled in the same manner as their superior or more "wholesome" counterparts. 23 However, these laudable goals to protect and inform consumers coexisted with increasing public and governmental support for advances in science and technology to increase the life cycles of food and prevent spoilage and enhance flavor.
The support for scientific and technological advances in food production and the limits on the agency's power under the statute in this respect was evidenced in cases decided by the Court during the same period as the misbranding cases. In contrast to the broader authority held by the agency in the misbranding cases, when considering the provision of the statute pertaining to adulterated foods, 24 Lexington Mill & Elevator Co., 232 U.S. 399, 409 (1914) ("The statute upon its face shows that the primary purpose of Congress was to prevent injury to the public health by the sale and transportation in interstate commerce of misbranded and adulterated foods. The legislation, as against misbranding, intended to make it possible that the consumer should know that an article purchased was what it purported to be; that it might be bought for what it really was, and not upon misrepresentations as to character and quality. As against adulteration, the statute was intended to protect the public health from possible injury by adding to articles of food consumption poisonous and deleterious substances which might render such articles injurious to the health of consumers.").
producers and manufacturers to include "poisonous or other added deleterious ingredient[s]" to their products so long as they were not injurious to the public health. 26 In that case, the Court cited legislative history to demonstrate that Congress did not intend to grant the agency the authority to regulate any product that might contain poison in the form of chemical additives.
27
The Lexington Mill decision left room for the argument that the agency retained a broad grant of authority if it was able to show that the additive may have some injurious effect rather than requiring a showing that the additive actually did cause some sort of injury to health. However, the legislative support for making this claim in all instances where a producer or manufacturer used what the agency deemed a poison in the manufacturing process did not exist. Consequently, even in these early years when the purposes of the Act were to protect human health and the purity of foods, Congress' apparent willingness to permit chemical additives in food products where the agency sought to prevent them demonstrated the broad support for what were then considered advances in food production, which has endured for many decades.
B. The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 28
While the Food and Drugs Act of 1906 persisted for many years, mounting concerns over the limited authority of the agency, as well as the inability of the Act to address unregulated and emerging risks with respect to food and drug safety, in addition to the expanding field of cosmetics led to the drafting of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938. The proposed Act was much stronger in the sense that it gave the agency greater enforcement authority and the ability to set standards for the identity and quality of food products. This was a critical addition as it created enforceable, legal standards that the government could use in misbranding and adulteration cases. Additionally, the FDCA did not appear to interfere with the states' ability to continue to regulate food products within their borders even where the states' laws might have affected interstate commerce except for those situations where the laws conflicted or where Congress created a system of "thorough regulation" 29 for a specific product.
The specific provisions within the Act regarding misbranding have not been amended since passage of the 1938 Act and largely reflect the same principles, if not similar language, to the provisions included in the 1906 Act. Following the reasoning from the Court's decision in the Ninety-Five Barrels case, the courts considering misbranding cases under the new Act held that labels including disclaimers regarding misleading statements did not cure the misbranding 30 , as courts would consider the permissibility of the language in light of "the probable inference a 26 Id. at 411 ( "If it cannot by any possibility, when the facts are reasonably considered, injure the health of any consumer, such flour, though having a small addition of poisonous or deleterious ingredients, may not be condemned under the act."). 27 Id. at 411-412 ("although it may be said in passing that the meaning which we have given to the statute was well expressed by Mr. Heyburn, chairman of the committee having it in charge upon the floor of the Senate (Congressional Record, vol. 40, pt. 2, p. 1131) : 'As to the use of the term 'poisonous,' let me state that everything which contains poison is not poison. It depends on the quantity and the combination. A very large majority of the things consumed by the human family contain, under analysis, some kind of poison, but it depends upon the combination, the chemical relation which it bears to the body in which it exists, as to whether or not it is dangerous to take into the human system.'"). 28 21 U.S.C. § 301 et al. 29 Developments in the Law : The Federal, Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 632, 636 (1954 consumer might draw from it.
31 " Moreover, the Supreme Court held that the new version of the Act was Congress' attempt to further strengthen its ability to regulate and control harmful food and drugs in commerce.
32 Specifically, the Act was meant to "touch phases of the lives and health of people which, in the circumstances of modern industrialism, are largely beyond selfprotection." 33 Commentators have opined that these cases set the tone for an era of deference to proactive agency decisions intended to further the goals of the statute. 34
The Agency's Interpretations of the Act
With respect to this line of reasoning, the current FDA generally follows the same logic. In other words, the agency remains concerned about misbranding and the potential for consumer confusion or deception. However, rather than regulating to increase the availability of information for consumers, the FDA now takes the approach that information regarding the absence of certain additives or indicating a different process that does not include drugs or additives is misleading to consumers in the sense that it suggests a superior product. Consequently, where the agency used to require manufacturers to disclose more, it has moved away from this approach in many respects. For those producers who voluntarily choose to disclose that they have not used certain processes or included certain additives that might be considered harmful, the agency now attempts to regulate those statements under the guise of consumer deception. This represents what appears to be a significant departure from the agency's position in its infancy.
Currently, the FDA maintains its authority under the FDCA is limited to requiring the labeling of products that are misbranded because of "false or misleading" labeling. 35 To determine whether a product's labeling is false or misleading, the agency must consider "the extent to which the labeling or advertising fails to reveal facts material…with respect to the consequences which may result from the use of the article to which the labeling or advertising relates…under such conditions of use as are customary or usual." 36 In other words, the FDA's interpretation of the FDCA is that it authorizes them to require mandatory labeling of foods that have the potential to be misbranded only when the labeled feature involves facts material to possible consequences of the use of the food product due to some material chemical difference in what the food actually is versus what it purports to be on the label. Unfortunately, the Act provides no guidance as to what might be considered a "material fact" and this is determined by the agency on a case by case basis.
While the provisions of the current Act closely resemble the language included in the 1906 Act, in practice, the FDA currently approaches these requirements very differently than it did in the early years of regulation. Specifically, the agency appears to have adopted a position that tends to favor industry rather than full disclosure aimed at consumer protection and access to information. Despite mounting public concern over genetically engineered food, and consumer requests for greater efforts on the part of the FDA to require mandatory disclosure labeling, the agency consistently states it lacks authority under the FDCA to require specific labeling of food products based on consumer interest alone.
37 Moreover, with regard to voluntary labeling, in its guidance, the agency suggests that producers and manufacturers should be careful in their statements about the production of food so that they do not mislead or confuse consumers into thinking the product is superior to a similar or identical product that has been processed differently. These issues regarding both mandatory and voluntary food labeling have been central to the debate over milk from cows treated with rBST.
II. FDA's Approval of rBST and Resulting Challenges
A.
Introduction of rBST to the Market
Marketed "as an important tool to help dairy producers improve the efficiency of their operations and produce more milk more sustainably 38 " and one that can "effectively reduce the environmental impact of dairy operations, 39 " rBST has been the subject of intense scrutiny since Monsanto's application for FDA approval of the supplement in 1987. 40 Posilac©, or Monsanto's commercial version of recombinant bovine somatotropin (rBST) is a genetically engineered "supplement of the naturally occurring cow hormone BST, that when administered to cows allows them to produce more milk."
41 Its natural counterpart, bovine somatotropin (BST) is produced in the pituitary glands of mature cows to control their lactation cycles.
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Since the 1930s, scientists have been aware that the injection of BST had the potential to result in increased milk production after British scientists injected BST taken from deceased cows into living ones. 43 On a commercial scale, this process is largely inefficient due to the inadequacy of the small quantities that can reasonably be extracted from each carcass to meet the massive demand. 44 However, the introduction of recombinant DNA techniques in the 1980s allowed for a procedure that could mimic that attempted in the 1930s due to the development of rBST, which was able to be produced inexpensively on a large scale. 
B.
Early Safety Concerns about the Use of rBST
Prior to its final approval for the use of rBST for animals, the FDA approved the drug for "research purposes only" pending completion of its full investigative process, but allowed milk and beef products from cows treated with the hormone to be sold and consumed pending approval. 46 Following this preliminary approval, the General Accounting Office was asked to take a look at the agency's investigational review of Monsanto's application to determine whether the agency had, in fact, conducted a thorough investigation. 47 As part of its review process, the FDA required Monsanto to perform studies assessing whether rBST was biologically absorbed into the body, which could have required additional studies to determine its potential impact of bodily organs, and, specifically, the liver. 48 To complete this study, Monsanto administered the hormone orally to rats over a twenty-eight (28) day period at 100 times the dose approved for administration to dairy cows. 49 Based on the results of this limited study, the FDA determined that the findings did not demonstrate absorption of biologically active rBST. 50 This finding was later substantiated by the expert panel retained for the preparation of the GAO Report.
51
In most respects, the GAO's expert panel supported the findings of the FDA with one critical exception. Specifically, the GAO noted that while the FDA's investigation largely considered the direct risks of rBST on human health and food safety, the agency had failed to consider the indirect human food safety risks that could result from negative health impacts to animals injected with the drug. 52 In making this conclusion, the GAO focused on the increased risk for cattle treated with rBST to develop mastitis, an infection of the udder, often treated by antibiotics that can remain in milk in trace amounts. 53 The GAO expressed concern that antibiotic residue levels in milk were already at unsafe levels due to the FDA's inadequate survey system, which made the agency's failure to assess whether the use of rBST would further increase the levels of antibiotics in milk even more problematic. Interestingly, the GAO report also raised concerns about the FDA's unwillingness to label food products derived from animals treated with investigational drugs. 55 While the agency agreed in principle that this was an issue that needed to be addressed in the future, it felt this was the wrong situation to require such labeling, as it had determined rBST presented no risk to human health. 56 The agency largely agreed with the findings of the GAO report, however, on this point, the two diverged, as the GAO report stated, "we believe the public should have the right to know which food products have been produced from animals being tested with investigational drugs." 57 C.
FDA Approval of rBST and the Resulting Challenges
Despite concerns over the safety of rBST for both animals and humans, in 1993, the FDA approved the use of the artificial hormone, finding it was "safe and effective for dairy cows, that milk from rBST treated cows [was] safe for human consumption, and that production and use of the product [did] not have a significant impact on the environment."
58 Moreover, the agency determined "there was no significant difference between milk from treated and untreated cows." 59 Consequently, the agency issued guidance to the industry stating that because it did not find a compositional difference existed in the two types of milk, it was unable to require mandatory labeling of milk from cows treated with rBST. Moreover, with regard to statements about the absence of hormones, or the absence of rBST in particular, the FDA issued guidance advising producers to tailor the statements on their labels to focus on process rather than composition, and include an appropriate disclaimer noting that the FDA found no significant difference between the two types of milk. 61 In other words, the FDA encouraged manufacturers and producers to ensure their statements did not imply or lead consumers to draw the inference that milk from cows not treated with rBST was not of a superior quality given their findings.
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The FDA's findings regarding the safety of rBST were later challenged by two advocacy groups, the Vermont Public Interest Research Group ("VPIRG") and Rural Vermont, as a Canadian report prepared for Health Canada (the Canadian counterpart to the FDA) in 1999 noted a number of potential risks to humans based on a ninety (90) day study submitted by Monsanto for approval in the European Union ("EU"), which was allegedly also submitted to the FDA during its approval process. In the Canadian report, the panel made several findings that were also addressed by the GAO panel and continue to spark debate in the battle over the safety of rBST. 64 Specifically, that panel found that Monsanto's ninety (90) day rat study demonstrated an antibody response to rBST leaving open the question of a hypersensitivity response in humans.
65 Additionally, as noted by both the FDA and the GAO report, the concentration of Insulin-like Growth Factor 1 ("IGF-1") is increased in milk from cows treated with rBST, the complete effects of which were then unclear, but in the panel's opinion, could potentially result in an increased risk of cancer for specific individuals. 66 The Canadian panel also expressed consternation over the increased risk for cattle treated with rBST to develop mastitis for the same reasons cited in the GAO report.
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Based on its findings, the panel concluded that Health Canada had enough information to make a decision about whether it should approve the use of rBST, however it stated, "[t]he only definitive proof of absolute safety of milk from rbST-treated cattle would be long term follow up data in a population exposed to the resulting food products."
68 Ultimately, Health Canada chose not to approve Monsanto's application. 69 1.
Stauber v. Shalala
The case the FDA uses to support its claims regarding its inability to require mandatory labeling of milk products from cows injected with rBST was filed in immediate response to the agency's approval of the artificial growth hormone and warrants some discussion, as the FDA continues to publicly rely on the holding as a limit to its authority in this context. 70 In Stauber v. 64 
Report of the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada -Expert Panel on Human Safety of rBST,
January 1999, available at http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/vet/issues-enjeux/rbst-stbr/rep_rcpsc-rap_crmcc_final-a-eng.php#hebfp (last visited September 1, 2011) ("bST does cause increased production of IGF-1 and may, on the basis of rat studies, cause an antibody response in some recipients of oral dosing. The latter response warrants further study in order to determine the likelihood of human hypersensitivity reactions. The implications of human exposure to slightly increased IGF-1 production (1% increment over normal exposure) would be impossible to study in any animal or human model. .pdf ("Fifth, FDA cannot require additional labeling about production methods unless it is necessary to ensure that the labeling is not false or misleading. Another way of stating this point is that FDA cannot require labeling based solely on differences in the production process if the resulting products are not materially different due solely to the production process. For example, recombinant Bovine Somatotropin ("rBST") is a synthetic growth hormone that increases milk production in dairy cows. Because FDA found that there was no material difference between milk from rBST-treated cows and milk from non-rBST-treated cows, FDA did not have the authority to require additional labeling of milk from rBST-treated cows.") (citing 72 Fed. Reg. 16291, Shalala 71 , the United States District Court of Wisconsin considered the issues on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, finding in favor of the defendants, Donna Shalala, then Secretary of Health and Human Services, and David Kessler, M.D., then Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration. In addition to arguing that the FDA's decision to approve the drug was arbitrary and capricious because of the agency's failure to consider the health and safety effects of rBST, the plaintiffs, who were consumers of commercial dairy products, argued that the FDCA required the agency to mandate labeling of any products derived from cows treated with rBST due to "material facts" about the differences in the milk.
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The plaintiffs advanced two theories to support their argument that the FDA was mandated by law to require labeling of milk from cows treated with rBST. First, milk produced from cows that have been treated with rBST is "organoleptically" different from milk produced from non-rBST treated cows.
73 Second, the "widespread consumer desire for mandatory labeling of rBST-derived milk" evidenced a degree of demand which, in turn, amounted to a material fact triggering the labeling requirements under the FDCA. 74 Under section 201(n) of the FDCA, "[i]nformation disclosing differences in performance characteristics (e.g., physical properties, flavor characteristics, functional properties and shelf life) is a material fact under section 201(n) of the act because it bears on the consequence of the use of the article."
75 Consequently, any failure to disclose this information to the consumer on the label was misleading causing the product to be misbranded under section 403(a). The evidence submitted by the plaintiffs to substantiate their claims that rBST has a negative impact on human health was presented largely in the form of affidavits, which the court noted were not given to the FDA during the approval process, and therefore, could not be considered in this proceeding as they were outside the record before the agency. 77 The court noted that the plaintiffs also relied on an affidavit from Dr. Richard Burroughs 78 , who was a 16294 (Apr. 4, 2007); 59 Fed. Reg. 6279 (Feb. 10, 1994) Id. Section 403(a) provides: "A food shall be deemed to be misbranded --(a) If (1) its labeling is false or misleading in any particular, or (2) in the case of a food to which section 411 applies, its advertising is false or misleading in a material respect or its labeling is in violation of sec. 411(b)(2)."
77 Id. at 1190 ("Plaintiffs cannot ask this court to rely on opinions within the medical community regarding health risks posed by rbST without first establishing that those opinions were presented to the FDA before it granted approval of Posilac."); see also Marden, supra note 40, at 634 (Marden suggests the court unnecessarily expanded the scope of the rule barring judicial review of an agency's findings to prohibit review of "nonagency" data outside the record). 78 Burroughs was terminated from the FDA in 1988, allegedly for incompetence. Upon his firing, Burroughs made public statements about the FDA's review of rBGH alleging that the agency was ignoring problems with the drug while Monsanto was manipulating the data. Burroughs was reinstated after it was determined he was improperly fired. However, his allegations were taken seriously enough that the GAO was asked to investigate the issue leading to the report mentioned above. Food and Water Watch, rBGH: How Artificial Hormones Damage the Dairy veterinary medical officer for the FDA that participated in the review process for Posilac©. 79 In the court's opinion, because the plaintiffs relied on this affidavit only to support the proposition that rBST can have serious negative health consequences for cows, the court considered it only in that regard and accepted those facts as undisputed.
80 However, Dr. Burroughs' affidavit also cited several critical flaws in the agency's review of the drug, in addition to concerns about Monsanto's testing processes. 81 While this information could have been useful to clarify the record before the agency or to illuminate the agency's decisionmaking process and help the court determine whether the resulting decision was arbitrary and capricious, the court stated it could not consider the affidavit in that light, as it was not proffered for that purpose.
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While sympathetic to the issues raised by the plaintiffs, the court deferred to the findings of the agency regarding the safety of rBST, holding its decision to approve the hormone was not arbitrary and capricious. 83 The court then went on to analyze the issue of mandatory labeling under the FDCA. Addressing plaintiff's arguments that the milk from cows injected with rBST differs organoleptically from that of cows not treated with rBST, the court found that plaintiffs failed to point to evidence in the record proving that the two types of milk differ in terms of performance characteristics or organoleptic properties.
84 Specifically, the plaintiffs did not demonstrate that the administration of rBST has an impact on the composition of milk.
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The plaintiffs also argued that widespread consumer demand for labeling information about milk from cows treated with rBST necessitates mandatory labeling under the Act. 86 However, the FDA only considers consumer demand when making a determination about disclosures of material facts on labels when it has determined that the product is different than what it says it is and that difference is something about which consumers would want to know. 87 Therefore, even if consumers viewed the product as different, the FDA could not require labeling unless a material difference exists between the two products or it would risk running afoul of the FDCA. 88 In Stauber, the court held that the "plaintiffs [did] not present[] any evidence demonstrating organoleptic differences between regular and rbST-derived milk or of any harmful effects of rbST on consumers," therefore, a label stating the milk was derived from cows treated with rBST would constitute misbranding under the Act.
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In some respects, the Stauber decision does not seem to reflect a departure from the original cases interpreting the misbranding provisions of the Act. The court deferred to the agency's decision not to require labeling, based on its finding that no material difference existed between milk from cows treated with rBST and those that were not. 90 However, what is striking about the Stauber case is the agency's departure from its previous role of preventing consumer fraud by erring on the side of caution and giving consumers more, rather than less, information about the products they are purchasing.
III.
State Legislative Response and First Amendment Challenges A.
International Foods v. Amestoy
In response to the FDA's unwillingness to require labeling of products from cattle treated with rBST, the Vermont legislature enacted a statute mandating the labeling of milk and milk products offered for sale within the State that were derived from cattle treated with rBST. 91 The legislature cited "strong consumer interest" and the "public's 'right to know'" as the bases for the law. 92 The plaintiffs, a group of dairy manufacturers, challenged the constitutionality of the law under the First Amendment and the Commerce Clause, and requested injunctive relief to prevent its enforcement. 93 Ultimately, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided the case on First Amendment grounds and did not reach the Commerce Clause issues.
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With regard to a showing of irreparable harm, the court reversed the lower court's decision, holding that because the statute required the dairy manufacturers to speak when they desired to remain silent, it "'contravene[d] core First Amendment values,'" which resulted in irreparable harm to the plaintiffs.
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The court also determined that plaintiffs successfully demonstrated they would likely be successful on the merits. 96 Using the four part test articulated in Central Hudson 97 , which pertains to commercial speech, the court considered: "(1) whether the expression concerns lawful activity and is not misleading; (2) whether the government's interest is substantial; (3) whether the labeling law directly serves the asserted interest; and (4) whether the labeling law is no more
